This paper analyzes the role of goods market frictions in accounting for the large and volatile deviations from the Law of One Price in a framework of ‡exible prices.
Introduction
One of the most enduring puzzles in international macroeconomics, observed since the beginning of the post-Bretton Woods era, is that deviations from the Law of One Price (LOP) and its generalization, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), are not only large but also highly volatile and persistent. Rogo¤ (1996) refers to the juxtaposition of these observations and the predictions of structural models as the PPP puzzle. Traditionally, the attempts to address this puzzle have been based on the distinction between tradable and non-tradable goods. However, since the in ‡uential work by Engel (1999) , most studies have shed light on the LOP deviations of tradable goods as the empirically relevant foundation of the current theoretical approaches. 1 Although the importance of international transaction costs in generating LOP deviations has been well documented, only a few papers have studied the role played by domestic transaction costs and their interplay with international costs in shaping the behavior of the real exchange rate. In this paper, we o¤er a new approach to explain the PPP puzzle in a framework of ‡exible prices. We specify a two-country world economy, allowing for two types of goods market frictions, namely, international trade costs and domestic distribution services.
The inclusion of these frictions allows us to endogenously drive a natural wedge between the 1 Engel (1999) shows that almost all the real exchange rate ‡uctuations are attributable to ‡uctuations in the relative prices of tradable goods between the U.S. and other industrialzed countries.
prices in di¤erent locations and thus account for the deviations from the LOP, even though all goods are tradable. Further, the distinction between domestic and international costs guides us to highlight two di¤erent channels through which these costs a¤ect LOP deviations.
Our model thus encompasses the main elements of the standard models that study the role of transaction costs in explaining real exchange rate dynamics. However, our approach has three notable distinctions. First, we distinguish between domestic and international goods market frictions. Speci…cally, in addition to iceberg-type international trade costs, we incorporate domestic distribution costs by assuming that consuming a tradable good requires certain units of distribution services. Second, we elaborate on channels through which these costs and their interactions can a¤ect the magnitude and volatility of LOP deviations. Third, we do not model nominal rigidities and deliberately focus on the role of goods market frictions.
Our approach is meant to o¤er a framework to help understand the long-run real exchange rate by placing an emphasis on real frictions that drive large and volatile deviations from the LOP.
Our main …ndings are as follows. As widely known, trade costs appear to introduce the no-arbitrage band in which trade does not occur and hence directly generate the LOP deviations. We …nd that distribution costs also contribute to these deviations by a¤ecting the direction of trade and the probability that trade will occur given the no-arbitrage band.
By doing so, an increase in trade costs enlarges the deviations from the LOP by widening the no-arbitrage band, whereas a unilateral rise in distribution costs makes the real exchange rate more likely to move toward the boundary of the band generating the LOP deviations. The
Monte Carlo Simulation shows that the volatility of LOP deviations is positively associated with trade costs, but negatively related to distribution costs. This e¤ect depends on the interplay of trade costs and distribution costs, as they work in opposite directions when creating arbitrage opportunities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup. Section 3 solves for the equilibrium real exchange rate and discusses how distribution costs and trade costs a¤ect the deviations from the LOP. Section 4 carries out a Monte Carlo simulation to examine the e¤ects of goods market frictions on the real exchange rate volatility. Section 5 concludes. 
The Model
in the home country, and
in the foreign country, where 0< <1 is the expenditure share of tradable goods, 0< <1 is the discount factor, and >1 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
In every period, each economy is exogenously endowed with tradable (Y 
We next introduce international trade costs of the iceberg type by assuming that a proportion of the physical shipment of the tradable good is lost in transit. We use to denote the trade costs faced by home and foreign individuals, which are symmetric across countries.
In this setting, when one unit is shipped, only
1+
units actually arrive. Given the presence of trade costs, the resource constraints for the home and foreign country are given by
where X t is the amount of exports from the home country (measured before trade costs) and
is the amount of imports from the foreign country (measured after trade costs).
Given our assumption of complete …nancial markets, the model is solved as a central planner problem whose objective is to maximize the aggregate utility by choosing the amount of trade:
subject to constraints (3)- (8) Because this problem is essentially static, we drop the time subscript t henceforth to simplify the notations.
LOP deviations
When …nancial markets are complete, the ratio of home to foreign marginal utility of consumption is linked to real exchange rates. From the optimality condition of consumption, it follows that the relative price of any pair of goods can be seen as a marginal rate of substitution in the optimum,
where Q denotes the real exchange rate of tradable goods between the home and foreign countries. From a standard Lagrangian problem of a central planner, the real exchange rate of tradable goods is then given as follows:
: FC exports (11) where ! = + .
5 Equation (11) shows that the behavior of the real exchange rate is determined by three key elements: …rst, the output ratios of tradable and non-tradable goods between countries; second, the trade costs; and third, the distribution services. In the absence of non-tradable goods and trade costs, the central planner always equalizes the marginal utilities of consumption of tradable goods across countries, leading the real exchange rate equal to unity.
However, in an economy with goods market frictions, the tradable goods will be moved across countries only if the gains from trade are su¢ ciently large to cover these frictions. To see how our model bears this out, consider three possible trade and price pairings, as shown in Equation (11) . First, if the home output of tradable goods is su¢ ciently large relative to the foreign output that the gains from trade are large enough to cover the trade costs, the goods ‡ow from the home country to the foreign country, and the price in the foreign country is 4 The derivation of equation (11) greater than the home price. Second, if the foreign output is su¢ ciently large relative to the home output, goods ‡ow from the foreign country to the home country and the price in the home country is greater than the foreign price. Third, when the output ratio of tradable goods is su¢ ciently close across countries, a non-trade equilibrium exists. In this case, the implied price di¤erential is not su¢ cient at these endowment levels to justify paying the trade costs. Therefore, the implicit relative price is a matter of reading o¤ the appropriate marginal valuations, expressed as the ratio of home and foreign marginal utility evaluated at autarkic output points.
It is worthwhile to note that, because of distribution costs, the real exchange rate (Q)
does not move in tandem with the output ratios within the no-arbitrage band, driving a natural wedge between relative prices in di¤erent locations. To see why distribution costs generate the deviations from the LOP, note that Equation ( (11) implies that the response of
The change in K is increasing in Y T and, more importantly, this e¤ect is magni…ed by the home distribution cost ( ). This is intuitive, since increasing the distribution cost has similar e¤ects to decreasing home consumptions of the tradable good. The combination of the …rst condition of Equation (11) and Equation (12) implies that a given increase in Y T produces a larger probability that the home country can export the larger is the home domestic distribution cost. As such, an increase in home distribution costs makes the price in the foreign country more likely to be greater than the home price, thus causing deviations from the LOP. Therefore, trade costs generate the LOP deviations by introducing the noarbitrage band, while distribution costs cause the price to deviate from the LOP by a¤ecting the probability that trade occurs given the no-arbitrage band.
Lastly, from Equation (11), one can easily see how the LOP deviations of tradable goods decay as we move from an economy with goods market frictions to an economy without these frictions. When distribution services do not exist (i.e., = = 0), trade costs still drive a natural wedge between relative prices in di¤erent locations, however the real exchange rates now move in tandem with output ratios within the threshold. When both distribution services and non-tradable goods are absent (i.e., = = 0, = 1), the real exchange rate within the threshold does not depend on the output ratio of non-tradable goods. In an extreme case where all goods market frictions are eliminated ( = = = 0, = 1), the central planner sets the optimal relative consumption of the tradable good equal to unity and corrects any deviations from unity by re-allocating goods. As a result, the LOP will unambiguously hold for tradable goods such that the real exchange rate equals to unity.
Volatility of LOP deviations
Our results discussed in Section 3 support the argument that unless price di¤erentials exceed the no-arbitrage band, trade does not take place and price deviates freely; however, when the price di¤erentials are large enough to o¤set international trade costs, trade occurs and price di¤erentials in excess of the band are eventually arbitraged away. Therefore, the no-arbitrage band generated by goods market frictions is equivalent to a "band of inaction", such that LOP deviations decay slowly within the no-arbitrage band but rapidly outside the band.
Motivated by the fact that the arbitrage limits depend on the goods market frictions, in the following discussion we explore the e¤ect of these frictions on the real exchange rate volatility by simulating our model. Since the volatility of LOP deviations, measured as the time series variance of ln Q in Equation ( we …rst analyze the approximation of the volatility by focusing on the probability that trade does not occur. Then we conduct numerical experiments to quantify the importance of these costs.
6 6 We aim to provide meaningful insights into how goods market frictions can a¤ect real exchange rate volatility rather than evaluate the performance of the model in matching the time series properties observed in the data. We leave the latter work for our future study.
Simulating the model
Since the two economies considered in this model are symmetric in their preferences, all of the parameters governing the curvature properties of the utility function have the same value in both economies. We set to 2; as suggested by Backus et al. (1994) , and to 0.3 which is obtained from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 7 Following Burstein et al. (2003), we set = = 1:0 as a baseline value and vary from 1:0 to 2:0 to see the responses of the real exchange rate volatility to an increase in home distribution costs. 8 As is widely known, it is di¢ cult to compute the trade costs due to the inconsistency across countries in the bilateral value and quantity data for trade, the cross-hauling of goods, and aggregation bias. For this reason, we choose a reasonable value for (= 0:1) and then evaluate the behavior of the real exchange rate for di¤erent values of (0:1 s 1:0).
9
The Monte Carlo simulation is based on a data generation process of which algorithms depend on the distributional assumptions of output ratios. Our distributional assumptions are as follows. First, ln
10 A set of su¢ cient conditions for this assump-
are identically distributed. Third, from the recognition that
7 The expenditure share of the non-tradable sector in the U.S. ranges between 69.0% and 72.1% for the period 1990-2010. 8 Setting = 1 implies that the distribution margin is 50%, which is de…ned as the excess of retail price over producer price and measured as a percentage of the retail price. Burstein et al. (2003) report that distribution margins of consumption goods for six OECD countries (Canada, France, Germany Italy, Japan, the UK, and the U.S.) range between 35% and 50%. 9 Hummels (2001) estimates trade costs based on the direct measurement of the freight rate, which is de…ned as the ratio of transportation expenditure to the value of imports exclusive of freight and insurance charges. The all-commodities trade-weighted average freight rate ranges from 3.8% for the U.S. to 13.3% for Paraguay. Across commodities in the U.S., the freight rate ranges from a low of 0.9% for transport equipment to a high of 27% for crude fertilizer. In their extensive survey of the measurement of trade costs, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) show that 170% of 'representative' trade costs in industrialized countries breaks down into 21% of transportation costs, 44% of border-related trade barriers, and 55% of retail and wholesale distribution costs. 10 One might also assume that the di¤erence of the log of the output ratio is normally distributed, considering the fact that the real exchange rate tends to exhibit random walk behavior within the band.
we assume that ln
where T runcN ( ; 2 ; ln R min ; 1) is a normal distribution with mean and variance 2 truncated from below ln R min . Lastly, we assume
and
are mutually independent of each other.
The basic idea of the Monte Carlo simulation is simple. Given the parameters ; ; T ;
and R min as well as , , , , and , we can generate a multiple of triples
from the assumed distributions, and then from each of which we can compute ln K and ln Q.
Suppose we generate n of the triples, namely
; i = 1; :::; n o .
Then we can compute f(ln K) i ; i = 1; :::; ng and f(ln Q) i ; i = 1; :::; ng using Equation (11) . 
5 which we believe is a reasonable value. Lastly, we choose n = 500; 000.
Before proceeding to simulations, it is useful to note that, from Equation (11), the volatility of the LOP deviations is given by i.e., an increase in for unchanged levels of and . From Equation (11), we know that a higher unambiguously widens the no-arbitrage band within which price di¤erentials can ‡uctuate before arbitrage begins, while K remains una¤ected. Thus, an increase in is expected to produce a larger V [ln Q] by raising (1 P l P u ). A rise in home distribution cost ( ) has two e¤ects: a direct e¤ect on (1 P l P u ) and an indirect e¤ect via the probability mass of K being on the boundary point of the no-arbitrage band. These e¤ects are captured by looking at the impact of on E [ln K] which is approximated as follows:
where 2 = (1 )
(1 ) 1 and hence Equation (14) implies
Although not provided here, our simulation results show that V [ln K] is a positive func-
11 Equation (15) and
imply that an increase in drives up the mean and the variance of ln K and hence increases the probability that the home country will export to the foreign country (i.e., a rise in P u and a fall in (1 P l P u )), which is consistent with the discussion in the previous section. As the chance that ln K falls outside the no-arbitrage band rises, there will be more probability mass of ln K at the boundary point ln(1+ ), which will then reduce the real exchange rate volatility. Therefore, we can infer from Equation (13) that a rise in increases V [ln Q] by broadening the extent to which real exchange rates ‡uctuate freely, while a larger value of will decrease V [ln Q] by placing more probability mass of ln K on the upper boundary of the no-arbitrage band. 11 The derivation of E [ln K t ] and V [ln K t ] and the simulation result of
are o¤ered in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively.
Simulation results
We provide simulation results for the volatility of LOP deviations in which initially = 0:1; = = 1. Figure 1 illustrates the responses of arbitrage opportunities to changes in trade costs and home distribution costs. As expected, one can see that the probability that 
Conclusions
Understanding the determinants of LOP deviations and their links to real exchange rate volatility is a key challenge in international macroeconomics. Although a substantial body of empirical and theoretical work has documented this question, the channel through which real and nominal frictions a¤ect the puzzling behavior of real exchange rates remains unclear. In this paper, we o¤er an alternative approach to address the issue. By modeling the distribution costs and trade costs in a framework of ‡exible prices, we explicitly analyze the role of goods market frictions in driving large and volatile deviations from the LOP. We …rst show that trade costs in conjunction with output ratios generate the no-arbitrage band in which trade does not occur, while distribution costs cause the price to deviate from the LOP by a¤ecting the probability that trade will occur, given the band. Therefore, arbitrage opportunities and LOP deviations are directly a¤ected by trade costs through the introduction of the band of inaction, whereas distribution costs in ‡uence them through a direction of trade and the resulting movements of LOP deviations toward the boundary of the band.
We next show that the real exchange rate volatility is positively associated with trade costs, but negatively related to distribution costs. Because these costs work in opposite directions when creating arbitrage opportunities, the extent to which a cost a¤ects the real exchange rate volatility hinges on its interaction with the other cost. Our work contributes to the literature by providing a tractable theoretical framework that can be used to carry out explicit analyses of the long-run real exchange rate through the lens of two types of goods market frictions: domestic transaction costs and international transaction costs. We view our framework as complementary to those that emphasize the role of sticky prices.
Our …nding implies that goods market frictions generate a rigid threshold around which real exchange rates behave in a non-linear manner. A promising avenue for future work involves the development of the tractable framework considered here to explicitly examine the role of distribution services and trade costs in the non-linear mean reversion of the real exchange rate.
Then ln K can be rewritten as
Similarly, assuming R 
